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CHIEF HARRY PARKER (warden)

Federal/Civil~

v.
RANDOLPH, PICKENS &
HAMILTON (convicted murderers)
sm·U,1ARY:

Timely

Petitioner seeks revie\v of the affirmance of the

DC's grant of habeas relief to three convicted murderers. Petitioner
contends the lower courts erred in applying Bruton and in holding
that the Bruton error found was not harmless beyond a doubt in
this ''interlocking confession" case.

Additionall~,

contends the lower courts violated 28 u.s.c.

§

petitioner

2254(d) by not

affording a presumption of correctness to state court findings
regarding alleged Miranda violations fully and fairly litigated
in the state court criminal proceedings.

fl~ ~ ~q_c.Jco/ ~~ ~ ·

FACTS: Petitioners were convicted of felony murder · committed

(

in the course of a robbery of a poker game and sentenced to life
imprisonment. The robbery was initiated by Robert Wood, who had
been cheated in prior games by one William Douglas. According
to the plan devised by Robert's brother Joe, petititioners were
to break in and rob the game, and they would be given a share of
the proceeds.

Joe told petrs that he would be at the game and

would kill Douglas if necessary. Suffice it to say that things did
not go according to plan, and that 0oe was forced to draw on
Douglas and a bystander Thomas, give the gun to his brother,
and leave the room to get petrs. Before petrs and Joe returnedi
Robert had shot and killed Douglas, who allegedly had drawn on him.
Petrs then

brok·j~ith Joe~

Robert grabbed the money, and all fled

v'

but Thomas. Robert was the only defendant to take the stand at

L

trial. He argued self-defense and that the dirty rat deserved to die
-------~------------~
anyways. Robert could clearly identify only petr Hamilton as one
of the participants. Thomas could not identify any of the petrs
' l . V'
.c
d
at tr1a
None o f t h e petrs took the stand, but each had coniesse

to the robbery prior to the trial, and the confessions were admitted
~

-----------------

over objection under instructions to consider them only against
their individual authors.
so

as not to directly

Efforts were made to redact the confessions

incri~inate

....---

codefendants, but the State

has conceded previously that the redactions did not achieve their
intended purpose. Prior to trial efforts were made to suppress
the confessions as involuntary and taken in violation of Miranda,
but the motions were denied by the state court after a full hearing.
The Tennessee Court of Appeals reversed petrs' convictions
on the basis of

~uton

violations and on the ground that petrs

could not be convicted of felony murder because the murder had
occurred prior to the robbery. The Tennessee

Sup~eme

Court reversed

(

and reinstated the convictions. The felony murder convictions stood
because the murder was part of the res gestae of the robbery that
petrs had agreed to participate in. And, Bruton was inapposite
because each petitioner's

1

confession

·had rendered the preiudicial

impact of their codefendants' confessions de minimis and harmless

error in any event. Petitioners then sought federal habeas.
HOLDINGS BELOW: The district court granted relief on the basis

of the Bruton violations that the court could not regard as
The district court also

harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

found that relief was independently warranted as to petr Pickens
because his confession was taken after the police had denied his
request for counsel.
correctness given

The court found that the presumption of
the state trial court's contrary finding

of fact on this issue, 28 U.S.C.

§

2254(d), could not

because the finding was unsupported by the record.

sta~d

Pickens testified

that he had repeatedly asked for counsel to be present during
questioning. The interrogating officers testified to the contrary.
The DC found it "inconceivable" that Pickens would not have asked
for counsel because he had talked to

co~nsel

only hours before his

arrest and was advised to request counsel if he was arrested be f ore
counsel could meet with him and arrange his surrender.

~he

court of appeals affirmed on both grounds but discussed

only the Bruton ground at length; Acknowledging that there was
a clear conflict in the Circuits as to whether Bruton applied at all
~--- .-.-~-contextin the interlocking-confession/and as to whether~ if it did, the

-------------------'J!::.

' '

interlocking confessions rendered any Bruton error virtually
p~s ·,' the court followed its own rule that Bruton

(

applied, and further held that the error was not harmless beyond
'

a reasonable doubt in the circumstances of this case.
found nothing in Schneble v. Florida, 405
Harrington v. California, 395

u.s.

250

u.s.

(1969)

1

427

The court

(1972), or

that rendered

Bruton inapposite in the interlocking-confession context.
They were, however, relevant to the harmless error question in
that they demonstrate that the defendant's own confession was
to be taken into account in determining the harmless error issue.
Accordingly, in determining the harmless error issue, the court
"accept[ed] at face value each of the defenctants' confessions
• • • as it might apply in a single trial against him." But,
even when the confessions were taken into account along with

c

the other evidence admitted against petrs, the total evidence
against each petr, though sufficient to support a guilty verdict,
was not "so overwhelming as to compel the jury verdict of guilty.

11

The court concluded that it was not clear "beyond a reasonable
doubt" that the outcome would have been the same if each petr
was confronted with only his own r' and not his codefendants,, {
~onfession

because (1) petrs were not involved in the gambling;

(2) they did not originate the robbery plah?
when the deceased was killed;

(3) they were not present

(4) the jury could have found the

plan terminated when the mastermind pulled a gun. Moreover, had
two of the three confessions been removed from the jury's consciousness
by adherence to Bruton, the jury might well have .. determined that
each petr's confession was involuntary

(

CONTENTIONS: Petitioner argues that Bruton is inapposite in
an interlocking-confession case

'

because the risk of incurable

prejudice arising from the admission of a nontestifying codefendant's
confession is negligible when the defendant himself haS confessed.
Bruton

is distinguishable because it involved the admission of

a codefendant's confession against a nonconfessing defendant,
rather than interlocking confessions that each corroborated the
other as here.

In support of this argument, petr justifiably relies

on Catanzaro v. Mancusi, 404 F.2d 296 (2d Cir. 1968), Mack v.
Maggio, 538 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1976), and numerous other cases
that explicitly or implicitly adopt the same reasoning.
' ,'

\ ' '- '

,,

Alternatively, petr contends that c even if .Bruton applies
and renders each codefendant's confession inadmissible against

(

each defendant, the fact of the defendant's confession itself
renders any Bruton error so de minimis as to be almost per se
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
petr relies on United
1972), and other cases

State~

In support of this argument .•

v. Spinks, 470 F.2d 64 (7th Cir.

that have resulted in virtually automatic

application of the harmless error doctrine in the interlockingconfession context. Naturally, Harrington and Schneble

are relied

on in support of this harmless error doctrine,
Finally, petr urges error in the overturning of the state court's
finding that Pickens had not been denied his Miranda rights.
only
This finding, though/implicit in the state trial court's denial
of Pickens's motion to suppress his confession/ was entitled to
a presumption of correctness in the federal habeas proceeding.
28

u.s.c,

2254(d). Relying on LaVallee v. Delle Rose ~ 410

;.

u.s.

(

695 (1973}, petr argues that the DC erred in substituting its
credibility determinations ann judgment for that of the state
trial court on the Miranda issue.
ANALYSIS:

As the court of appeals admitted in its opinion,

and as even a cursory examinati.on of the cases cited in its
opinion will confirm, there is a f clear conflici)among the
Circuits regarding the applicability of Bruton and the harmless
error doctrine in "interlocking confession" or "parallel statement''
cases, such as this one.
Bruton

applie~

Some courts take the position that

and the harmless error question must be ascertained

on a case-by-case basis.

(6th Cir.}

does not apply in that context.

Others say Bruton simply
~.,...._...,

(2nd Cir.) Still others say

no Bruton error could be regarded as prejudicial and is almost
per se harmless in thl.s context.

(7th} And, many courts affirm

convictions in this context without finding any need to concern
themselves "with the legal nicety as to whether the case is
without the Bruton rule, or is within the Bruton rule and the
violation thereof constituting harmless error.'' Metropolis v.
Turner, 437 F.2d 207 (lOth Cir. 1971}.
are the conflicts between the CircuitS:
within the

Then, of course, there
and the state courts

respective Circuits, as here, between the Sixth

Circuit and the Tennessee Supreme Court.

The issues involved

cry out for Supreme Court review, whatever one's views on the merits.
Moreover, if petr's representation that the records before
the state and federal courts on Pickens's Miranda claim were

C-

virtually indistinguishable is correct, there would appear to

----------------~--------------u.s.c. 2254(d) problem in this case. Arguably, '

be a serious 28

\

at least, the district c urt simply substituted its judgment
for that of the state trial court on this factual issue after
holding a Townsend hearing. The presumption of correctness normally
accorded state court findings fell in this instance because the
district court determined that the state court finding simply
was not supported by the state court record. 28 U.S.C.

§

2254(d) (8)

does, of course, authorize federal district court review of the
sufficiency of the evidence in the state court record to support
a state court finding

but does not specify the standard of

review which the district court is to apply to the evidence
and state court record. Clearly, here, the district court drew
independent inferences from the state court record and appeared
to make de novo determinations of credibility. This may be
proper, but other courts at least have applied a "substantial

--------

-------------------------

evidence," Piche v. Rhay, 4/.2 F.2d 1309~ 1311 (9th Cir. 1970),
or "clearly erroneous," United States ex rel. Bornholdt v.
Ternullo, 402 F. Supp. 374, 377 (S.D.N.Y. 1975), standard of
review in these circumstances.

Neither Townsend v. Sain, 372

U.S. 293, 316 (1963), nor any subsequent decision of this Court
of which I

am aware clearly spells out the appropriate standard

of review for determining whether a state court finding is
"fairly supported" by the state court record within the meaning
of 28 U.S.C.

§

2254(d) (8).

This

case~ ·

thus, may well present

an appropriate opportunity to define and apply the applicable
standard of review.

'.__,

I

There is no response.

9/1/78
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SUPPLEMENTAL MEMORANDUM
TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Eric

DATE:

October 14, 1978

RE:

Parker v. Randolph, et al.
October 27, 1978 Conference

The requested response has now been received.

In a

somewhat rambling brief, two of the respondents, Randolph and
Pickens (Hamilton, the third resp,

has apparently not

responde~,

offer the following reasons for denying cert in this case.
First, it is contended that the decision on the Bruton

2.
issue is clearly correct on the merits.

Resps argue that Bruton

should apply in interlocking confession cases as much as in any
other context, and they dispute that the evidence against them was
so strong that the harmless error doctrine can do the state any
good.

They also claim that the confessions were not truly

interlocking to the extent that this would be a good case for the
Court to straighten out the conflict among the circuits on the
Bruton question.
With respect to the standard of review of the state trial
court's factual findings by the federaJ habeas court, resps argue
that the federal court could not · really give any presumptive weight
to the ruling if the state court since there was no statement of
findings and conclusions, just an order stating the result.

Resps

point out that in the habeas proceeding the state presented no
witnesses in its own behalf on the factual question (whether
Pickens had asked for counsel before his confession), but chose to
rely solely on the transcript of the hearing in state court.
Pickens, on the other hand, presented strong evidence, and the
federal district judge found the state's position to be

1

"practically inconceivable."
Whether the court of appeals was correct on the merits of
the Bruton issue is not critical to the decision to grant cert
because the existence of a circuit conflict on this important issue
is sufficient to justify review by this Court.

It is more
c.___. -

-~ im~~nt

- -------,

whether the confessions were truly interlocking.

If they

were not, then this might not be a very suitable vehicle in which
to decide the applicability of Bruton to cases falling within the

3.
interlocking confession pattern.

It is possible -- likely, in fact -

- that resps are understating the degree to which the confessions
corroborate each other, for they don't quote from the statements
themselves, and the opinions of the courts below don't address this
issue.

But if resps are correct, the Court might want to think

hard before granting.

If it looks like the conference is

interested in taking the issue, perhaps the case should be relisted

I

and the record called for to determine whether this is a suitable
case.

The legal oficers might be asked to check into this.
.....

.._.......-..--

-

- ---

A similar problem exists with respect to the standard-of-

review question.

If indeed the state trial court failed to state

its findings of fact and conclusions of law, this might not be an
ideal occasion to get into the amount of deference that a federal
habeas court must show to state trial court's factual findings.
The lower court's order doesn't seem to be among the papers at the
Court, so perhaps calling for the record would be helpful in this
respect as well.
These are important issues deserving of review, but I
think the Court should be careful not to jump into a case that
doesn't present the issues cleanly.

~

TO:

Mr. Justice Powell

FROM:

Eric

DATE:

November 10, 1978

RE:

Parker v. Hamilton, No. 78-99

~~V>~~-~
.

~

r1u-

--~

bs ~

~~~~~~
_ ~
A ·- n
/)-L '14~
~
t2, --'btl·~~ ~ ~

,.

The record in this case has been received.

J

I

____

recommended that you call for it to determine whether the
confessions of the three co-defendants were truly "interlocking"
to the extent necessary to present squarely the Bruton issue
raised in the petition for cert.

The record was also requested

in order to to determine whether the state trial court entered
any findings of fact.

If he did not, this would not be a good

__.,)

2.
'

case in which to decide what deference a federal habeas court
must afford factual findings by a state criminal court.
The record is voluminous, not well- indexed, and in a
bad physical state.

After about an hour I was able to locate two

of the confessions.

I am sure the other material is in there,

but it will take some time to dig it out and make the necessary
analysis.

If you think it is appropriate, it would be a big help

to me to have the legal officers take on this project.

Although

it is a troublesome task, it beats trying to write an opinion in
a case that never should have been granted.
With your approval, perhaps this assignment could be
refered · to the legal officers with the following instructions:

1.

Locate and copy the statements of the respondents,

as they were put in evidence at their state-court trial,
that form the basis of the alleged Bruton violation.

2.

Determine whether the confessions are "interlocking"

with respect to the relevant facts in such as way as to
present squarely the Bruton issue raised in the cert
petition.

3.

Locate and copy all the findings of fact and

conclusions of law made by the state-court trial judge.

3.
Incidentally, another cert petn raising the ~t9~
issue, perhaps on a better record, has been received and is
scheduled to be considered at the November 22 conference.
Tamilio v. New York, No. 78-5504.

I authored the preliminary

memorandum which has been annotated and put in your box.
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January 5, 1979 Conference
Supplemental List
No. 78-99

Motion for Appointment of
Counsel

PARKER

v.
RANDOLPH
Resps ask that Walter Lee Evans, Esq., be appointed to
represent them.
1968.

Mr. Evans was admitted to the bar of Tenn. in

He was appointed to represent resps in their s ucc ess ful habeas

petn, and to defend that decision in CA 6.
Mr. Evans appears qualified, but he does not say whether he
is a member of the bar of_this Court.

If not, he should be

appointed on the condition that he join.
1/2/79
sal

Richman
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CHAMBERS OF"

..JUSTICE POTTER STEWART

April 23, 1979

Re:

No. 78-99, Parker v. Randolph

Dear Bi 11 ,
I am glad to join your opinion for
the Court.
Sincerely yours,

0~,

\

Mr. Justice Rehnquist

.
/

Copies to the Conference

,.

·'

.·..

.•

. .,

lo: The Chief Justloe
lr. Justice Brennan

1r. Justice
.,. Justice
~. Justice
llr. Justice
Mr. Justice
Mr. Justice

Stewart
White
Marshall
Blackllun
Powell
Stevens

lroa: Mr. Justice Rehnqutat
3
Ciroulated: 2 APR 1979
Beoiroulated: ____________
1st DRAFT

SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES
No. 78-99
Harry Parker, Petitioner,) On Writ of Certiorari to the United
v.
States Court of Appeals for the
James Randolph et al.
Sixth Circuit.
[April -, 1979]

MR. JusTICE REHNQUIST delivered the opinion of the Court.
In Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123 (1968), this Court
reversed the robbery conviction of a defendant who had been
implicated in the crime by his codefendant's extrajudicial confession. Because the codefendant had not taken the stand
at the joint trial and thus could not be cross-examined, the
Court held that admission of the codefendant's confession had
deprived the defendant of his rights under the Confrontation
Clause of the Sixth Amendment. The issue before us in this
case is whether Bruton requires reversal of a defendant's conviction when the defendant himself has confessed and his confession "interlocks" with and supports the confession of his
codefendant. We hold that it does not.

I
Respondents were convicted of murder committed during
the commission of a robbery and were sentenced to life imprisonment. The cast of characters playing out the scenes
that led up to the fatal shooting could have come from
the pen of Bret Harte. 1 The story began in June 1970, when
1 As the Court of Appeals aptly commented, "This appeal involved a
sequence of events which have the flavor of the old West before the law
ever crossed the Pecos. The difference is that here there are no heroes and
here· there was a trial." 575 F. 2d 1178, 1179 (CA6 1978).

78-99-0PINION
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one William Douglas, a professional gambler from Las Vegas,
Nev., arrived in Memphis, Tenn., calling himself Ray Blaylock and carrying a. gun and a deck of cards. It ended on the
evening of July 6, 1970, when Douglas was shot and killed in
a Memphis apartment.
Testimony at the trial in the Tennessee state court showed
that one Woppy Gaddy, who was promised a cut of Douglas'
take, arranged a game of chance between Douglas and
Robert Wood, a sometime Memphis gambler. Unwilling to
trust the outcome of the contest entirely to luck or skill,
Douglas marked the cards, and by game's end Robert Wood
and his money had been separated. A second encounter
between the two men yielded similar results, and Wood grew
suspicious of Douglas' good fortune. In order to determine
whether and how Douglas was cheating, Wood brought to the
third game an acquaintance named Tommy Thomas, who had
a reputation of being a "pretty good poker player." Unknown
to Wood, however, Thomas' father and Douglas had been close
friends; Thomas, predictably, threw in his lot with Douglas,
purposefully lost some $1,000, and reported to Wood that the
game was clean. Wood nonetheless left the third game convinced that he was being cheated and intent on recouping his
now considerable losses. He explained the situation to his
brother, Joe E. Wood, and the two men decided to relieve
Douglas of his ill-gotten gains by staging a robbery of the
upcoming fourth game.
At this juncture respondents Randolph, Pickens, and Hamilton entered the picture. · To carry out the staged robbery, Joe
Wood enlisted respondent Hamilton, who was one of his
employees, and the latter in turn associated respondents Randolph and Pickens. Douglas and Robert Wood sat down to
the fourth and final contest on the evening of July 6, 1970.
Joe Wood and Thomas were present in the room as spectators.
During the course of the game, Douglas armed himself with a
. 38 caliber pistol and an automatic shotgun; in response to

78-99-0PINION
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this unexpected development Joe Wood pulled a derringer
pistol on Douglas and Thomas, gave the guu to Robert Wood,
and left to tell respondents to move in on the game. Before
respondents arrived, however, Douglas reached for his pistol
and was shot and killed by Robert Wood. Moments later,
respondents and Joe Wood broke down the apartment door,
Robert Wood gathered up the cash left on the table, and the
gang of five fled into the night. Respondents were subsequently apprehended by the police and confessed to their
involvement in the crime.
Respondents and the Wood brothers were jointly tried and
convicted of murder during the commission of a robbery.
Tenn. Code Ann. § 39-2402. 2 Each defendant was sentenced
to life imprisonment. Robert Wood took the stand at trial,
admitting that he had killed Douglas, but claiming that the
shooting was in self-defense. Thomas described Douglas'
method of cheating at cards and admitted his complicity in the
fraud on Robert Wood. He also testified in substance that
he was present in the room when Joe Wood produced the
derringer and when Robert Wood shot and killed Douglas.
None of the respondents took the stand. Thomas could
not positively identify any of them, and although Robert
Wood named Hamilton as one of the three men involved in
the staged robbery, he did not clearly identify Randolph and
Pickens as the other two. The State's case against respondents thus rested primarily on their oral confessions, found by
Tennessee Code Annotated § 39-2402 provides in pertinent part as
follows:
"39-2402, Mu1'de1' in the Fi1'st Deg1'ee-An individual commits murder in
the first degree if ...
" (4) he commits a willful, deliberate and malicious killing or murder during the perpetration of an~· arson, rape, robbery, burglarly, larceny, kidnapping, aircraft piracy, or unlawful throwing, placing or discharging of .a
qestructive device or bomb.''
2

78-99-0PINION
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the trial court to have been freely and voluntarily given, which
were admitted into evidence through the testimony of several
officers of the Memphis Police Department. 3 A written confession signed by Pickens was also admitted into evidence over
his objection that it had been obtained in violation of his
rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). The
trial court instructed the jury that each confession could be
used only against the defendant who gave it and could not be
considered as evidence of a codefendant's guilt.
The Tennessee Court of Criminal Appeals reversed respondents' convictions, holding that they could not be guilty of
felony murder since Douglas had been shot before they arrived
on the scene and. alternatively, that admission of their confessions at the joint trial violated this Court's decision in
Bruton. The Tennessee Supreme Court in turn reversed the
Court of Criminal Appeals and reinstated the convictions.
Because "each and every defendant either through words. or
actions demonstrated his knowledge that 'killing may be necessary,' " App. 237, the court held that respondents' agreement to participate in the robbery rendered them liable under
the Tennessee felony-murder statute for Douglas' death. The
Tennessee Supreme Court also disagreed with the Court of
Criminal Appeals that Bruton had been violated, emphasizing that the confession at issue in Bruton had inculpated a
nonconfessing defendant in a joint trial at which neither
defendant took the stand. Here, in contrast, the "interlocking
inculpatory confessions" of respondents Randolph, Pickens,
and Hamilton. "clearly demonstrated the involvement of each,
as to crucial facts such as time, location, felonious activity, and
3

Each of the confessions were subjected to a process of redaction in
which references by the confessing defendant to other defendants were
replaced with the words "blank" or "another per~on." As the Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit observed below, the confrssions were nevertheless "such as to !rave no possible doubt in the jurors' minds concrrning
the 'person[s]' referred to." 575 F. 2d, at 1180 (CA6 1978).

.
'
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awareness of the overall plan or scheme." App. 245. Accordingly, the Tennessee Supreme Court concluded: "The fact that
jointly tried codefendants have confessed precludes a violation
of the Bruton rule where the confessions are similar in material aspects." App. 245, quoting Tennessee v. Elliott, 524
S. W. 2d 473, 478 (Tenn. 1975).
The United States District Court for the Western District
of Tennessee thereafter granted respondents' applications for
writs of habeas corpus, ruling that their rights under Bruton
had been violated and that introduction of respondent Pickens'
uncounseled written confession had violated his rights under
Miranda v. Arizona, supra. The Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit affirmed. holding that admission of the confessions violated the rule announced in Bruton and that the error
was not harmless since the evidence against each respondent,
even considering his confession, was "not so overwhelming as
to compel the jury verdict of guilty ... " 575 F. 2d, at 1182.
The Court of Appeals frankly acknowledged that its decision
conflicts with decisions of the Court of Appeals for the Second
Circuit holding the Bruton rule inapplicable " [ w] here the
jury has heard not only a co-defendant's confession but the
defendant's own [interlocking] confession." United States ex
rel. Catanzaro v. Mancusi, 404 F. 2d 296, 300 (CA2 1968), cert.
denied, 397 U. S. 942 (1970). Accord, United States ex rel.
Stanbridge v. Zelker, 514 F. 2d 45, 48-50 (CA2), cert. denied,
423 U. S. 872 (1975); United States ex rel. Duff v. Zelker, 452
F. 2d 1009, 1010 (CA2 1971), cert. denied, 406 U. S. 932
(1972). We granted certiorari in this case to resolve that confiict.4 439 U.S. 978 (1978).
4
The conflict extends throughout the Courts of Appeals. The Courts
of Appeals for the Third and Sixth Circuit:; have expre:;,;ly ruled that the
Bruton rule applieH in the context of interlocking confrs:;ions, see Hodges v.
Rose, 470 F. 2d 643 (CA6 1978); United States v. DiGilio, 538 F. 2d 972,
981-983 (CA3 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1038 (1977), and the Court
of A11peals for the Ninth Circuit has done :;o impliedly, ser I gnaco v. Guarn,
413 F. 2d 513, 515-516 (CA9 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 943 (1970). In
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In Delli Paoli v. United States, 352 U. S. 232 (1957), a
nontestifying codefendant's confession, which incriminated a
defendant who had not confessed, was admitted at a joint trial
over defendant's hearsay objection. Concluding that "it was
reasonably possible for the jury to follow" the trial court's
instruction to consider the confession only against the declarant, this Court held that admission of the confession did
not constitute reversible error. Little more than a decade
later, however, Delli Paoli was expressly overruled in Bruton
v. United States, supra. In that case defendants Bruton and
Evans were ponvicted of armed postal robbery after a joint trial.
Although Evans did not take the stand, a postal inspector was
allowed to testify that Evans had orally confessed to having
committed the robbery with Bruton. The trial judge instructed the jury that Evans' confession was competent evidence against Evans, but was inadmissible hearsay against
Bruton and therefore could not be considered in determining
Bruton's guilt.
addition to tf Court of AppE>als for the Second Circuit, at least four
other Courts f Appeals have rejected the Bruton claims of confessing
defendants.
ases from the Fifth and Seventh Circuits have reasoned that
the Bruton m e does not apply in the context of interlocking confessions
and that, even if it does, the error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
See Mack v. ¥aggio, 538 F. 2d 1129, 1130 (CA5 1976); United States v.
Spinks, 470 F. 2d 64, 65-66 (CA7), cert. denied, 409 U. S. 1011 (1972).
Two other Co~rts of Appeals have rejected the Bruton claims of confessing
defendants, re(usin~ to concern themselves "with the legal nicety as to
whether the ... case is without the Bruton rule, or is within Bruton and
the violation hereof constitute[s] only harmless error." Metropolis v.
Turner, 437 ll 2d 207, 208-209 (CA10 1971); accord, United States v.
Walton, 538 F. 2d 1348, 1353-1354 (CAS), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1025
(1975). State court decisions in this area are in similar disarray. Compare, e. g .. Stfwart v. Arkansas, 519 S. W. 2d 733 (1975), and People v.
Moll, 26 N.Y. 2d 1, 256 N. E. 2d 175, cert. denied, sub nom. Stanbridgr v.
New York, 398 U.S. 911 (1970), with People v. Rosochacki, 41 Ill. 2d 483,
244 N. E. 2d 136 (Ill. 1969), and Connecticut v. Oliver, 160 Conn. 85, 273
A. 2d 867 (1970) .
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This Court reversed Bruton's conviction, noting that despite
the trial court's admittedly clear limiting instruction, "the
introduction of Evans' confession added substantial, perhaps
even critical, weight to the Government's case in a form not
subject to cross-examination." Bruton v. United States,
supra, 391 U. S., at 127-128. Bruton was therefore held to
have been denied his Sixth Amendment right of confrontation.
The Bruton court reasoned that although in many cases the
jury can and will follow the trial judge's instruction to disregard inadmissible evidence,
"there are some contexts in which the risk that the jury
will not, or cannot, follow instructions is so great, and the
consequences of failure so vital to the defendant. that
the practical and human limitations of the jury system
cannot be ignored. . . . Such a context is presented here,
where the powerfully incriminating extrajudicial statements of a co-defendant who stands accused side-by-side
with the defendant, arc deliberately spread before the
jury in a joint trial. Not only are the incrimi11ations
devastating to the defendant, but their credibility is
inevitably suspect, a fact recognized when accomplices do
take the stand and the jury is instructed to weigh their
testimony carefully given the recognized motivation to
shift blame onto others. The unreliability of such evidence is intolerably compounded when the alleged accomplice, as here. does not testify and cannot be tested by
cross-examination. It was against such threats to a fair
trial that the Confrontation Clause was directed." I d.,
at 135-136 (citations and footnotes omitted).
One year after Bruton was decided, this Court rejected the
notion that erroneous admission at a joint trial of evidence
such as that introduced in Bruton automatically requires
reversal of an otherwise valid conviction. See Harrington v.
California, 395 U. S. 250 (1969). In some cases the properly
admitted evidence of guilt is so overwhelming, and the prej-
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udicial effect of the codefendant's admission so insignificant
by comparison, that it is clear beyond a reasonable doubt that
introduction of the admission at trial was harmless error. 5
Petitioner urges us to follow the reasoning of the Court of
5 In Harrington v. California, 395 U. S. 250 (1969), four defendants
were found guilty of murder after a joint trial. Defendant Harrington
admitted being at the scene of the crime but denied complicity. His three
codefendants, however, confessed, and their confession;; were introduced at
trial with the instruction that the jury was to consider each confe~::sion only
against its source. One of Harrington's codefendants, whose confession
implicated Harrington, took the stand and was subject to cross-examination. The other two codefendants, whose statements corroborated Harrington's admitted presence at the scene of the crime, did not take the stand.
Noting the overwhelming evidence of Harrington's guilt, and the relatively
insignificant prejudicial impact of his codefendants' statements, the Court
held that "the lack of opportunity to cro,;s-examine [the non-testifying
trine to claimed violations of Bruton. In Schneble v. Florida, 405 U. S.
Calijor1tia, 386 U. S. 18 (1967) l" 395 U. S., at 253.
On two subsequent occa~ion,;, this Court has applied the harmle,;s error
doctrine to claimed violations of Bruton. In Schneble "· Florida, 405 U. S.
427 ( 1972), Schneble and a codefendant were found guilty of murder
following a joint trial. Althoug11 neither defendant took the stand, police
officers were allowed to testify as to a detailed confession given by Schneble
and a statement given by his codefendant wl1icl1 tended to corroborate
certain portions of Schneble';; confession. We assumed, without deciding
that admission of the codefendant's statement had violated Bruton, but
held that in view of the overwhelming evidence of Schneble';; guilt and the
comparatively insignificant impact of the codefendant',; statement, "any
violation of Br·uton that may have occurred at petitioner's trial was harmless error beyond a reasonable doubt." 405 U.S., at 428 (emphasis added).
In Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223 (1973), the prosecution introduced police testimony regarding extrajudicial statementR made by two
nontestifying codefendants. Each statement implicated both of the codefendants in the crimes charged. Neither codefendant took the stand,
and the police testimony was admitted into evidence at their joint trial.
Although the Solicitor General conceded that the statements were admitted
into evidence in violation of Bruton, this Court held that the police testimony "was merely cumulative of o1 her overwhelming and largely uncontroverted evidence properly before the jury." /d., at 231. Thus, .any
Bruton error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.
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Appeals for the Second Circuit and to hold that the Bruton
rule does not apply in the context of interlocking confessions.
Alternatively, he contends that if introduction of interlocking
confessions at a joint trial does violate Bruton, the error is
all but automatically to be deeme.d harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. We agree with petitioner that admission at the
joint trial of respondents' interlocking confessions did not
infringe respondents' right of confrontation secured by the
·Sixth and Fourteenth Amendme1its to the United States Constitution. but prefer to cast the issue in a slightly broader
form than that posed by petitioner.
Bruton recognized that admission at a joint trial of the
incriminating extrajudicial statements of a nontestifying
codefendant can have "devastating" consequences to a non ..
confessing defendant, adding "substantial, perhaps even critical weight to the Government's case:" 391 U. S., at 128.
Such statements go to the jury untested by cross-examination
and , indeed, perhaps unanswered altogether unless the defendant waives his Fifth Amendment privilege and takes the stand.
The prejudicial impact of a codefendant's confession upon an
incriminated defendant who has, insofar as the jury is concerned, mainta.i ned his innocence from the beginning is simply
too great in such cases to be cured by a limiting instruction.
The same cannot be said, however, when the defendant's own
confession-"probably the most probative and damaging evidence that can be admitted against him," Bruton v. United
States, supra, at 139 (WHITE, J.. dissenting) - is properly
introduced at trial. The defendant is "the most knowledgeable and unimpeachable source of information about his past
conduct." id. , at 140 (WHITE, J., dissenting), and one can
scarcely imagine evidence more damaging to his defense than
his own admission of guilt. Thus, th e incriminating statements of a codefendant will seldom , if ever, be of the "devastating" character referred to in Bruton when the incriminated
defendant has admitted his own guilt. The right protected

i.

~
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by Bruton-the "constitutional right of cross-examination,"
id., at 137-has far less practical value to a defendant who
has confessed to the crime than to o11e who has consistently
maintained his innocence. Successfully impeaching a codefendant's confession on cross-examination would likely yield
small advantage to the defendant whose own admission of
guilt stands before the jury unchallenged. Xor does the natural "motivation to shift blame onto others," recognized by
the Bruton Court to render the incriminating statements of
codefendants "inevitably suspect." id., at 136, require application of the Bruton rule when the incriminated defendant has
corroborated his codefendant's statements by heaping blame
onto himself.
The right of confrontation conferred by the Sixth Amendment is a safeguard to ensure the fairness and accuracy of
criminal trials, see Dutton Y. Evans, 400 U. S. 74, 89 (1970),
and its reach cannot be divorced from the system of trial by
jury contemplated by the Constitution. A crucial assumption
underlying that system is that juries will follow the instructions given them by the trial judge. Were this not so, it
would be pointless for a trial court to instruct a jury, and even
more pointless for an appellate court to reverse a criminal convictiOJ1 because the jury was improperly instructed. The Con-'
frontation Cla.use has never been held to bar the admission
into evidence of every relevant extrajudicial statement made
by a nontestifying declarant simply because it in some way
incriminates the defendant. See, e. g., id., at 80; Mattox v.
United States, 156 U. R. 237,240-244 (1895). And an instruction directing the jury to consider a codefendant's extrajudicial
statement only against its source has been found sufficient to
avoid offending the confrontation right of the implicated defendant in numerous decisions of this Court. 6
In Opper v. ['uited States, :1-l-8 U. S. 84 (1954), prtitionrr contendrcl
that the trial court had rrred in ovrrrnling his motion for RevrranrP, arguing that the jury may have improperly con~idcrcd statemrn(:.; of hi;; co.
8
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When, as in Bruton, the defendant has chosen not to take
the stand and has made no extrajudicial admission of guilt,
limiting instructions cannot be accepted as adequate to safeguard the defendant's rights under the Confrontation Clause.
Under such circumstances, the "practical and human limitations of the jury system," Bruton v. United States, 391 U. S.,
at 135, override the theoretically sound premise that a jury
will follow the trial court's instructions. But when the defendant's own confession is properly before the jury, we believe that the constitutional scaies tip the other way. The
possible prejudice resulting from the failure of the jury to follow the trial court's instructions !s not so "devastating" or
"vital" to the confessing defendant to require departure from
the general rule allowing admission of evidence with limiting
instructions. We therefore hold that admission of interlocking confessions with proper limiting instructions conforms to
the requirements of the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments
to "the United States Constitution. Accordingly, the judgment of the Court of Appeals as to respondents Hamilton and
Randolph is reversed.
defendant, which were inadmbsihle as to petitioner, in finding petitioner
guilty. Thi;; Court rejrcted the contention:

"It i;; within the sound diHcretion of the trial judge as to whether the
defendants should be tried together or several!~· and there i~ nothing in the
record to indicate an abuse of such discretion when petitionrr's motion for
scvrrance was ovPrruled. The trial judge here made clear and repentrd
ndmonitions to thr jury at appropriate times that Hollifield's incriminatory
statrments wrrr not to br considered in e:stabli~hing the guilt of the
petitioner. To say that the jury might have been confu::;ed amounts to
nothing more than an unfounded SJ)eculation that thr jurors dil:iregardrd
clear inHtruction:-; of the court in arriving at their verdict. Our theor~· of
trial rrlir:-; upon 1he abilitr of a jury to follow instructions. There is
nothing in thi;; rrcord to call for rever~al because of any C'onfu::;ion or
inju~tirf' ari::;ing from thr joint trial. Thr record contain::; substantial comprtent evidence upon which the jury could find petiti01wr guilty." !d., at
95; sec, e. g., Blumenthal v. United States, 332 U. S. 539, 552-553 (1947).
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III
The Court of Appeals affirmed the District Court's granting
of habeas corpus relief to respondent Pickens on the additional
ground that his rights under Miranda, v. Arizona, 384 U. S.
436 (1966) , had been violated. Although petitioner sought
review of this ruling. our grant of certiorari was limited to the
Bruton issue. We thus have no occasion to pass on the merits
of the Court of Appeals Miranda ruling. Accordingly, the
judgment of the Court of Appeals as to respondent Pickens is
affirmed.
Affirmed in part and reversed in part.
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